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Picking rounds

Everybody pick for im turn, for drawn order.

Dem fix order, often by draw, then each person take dia favourite from wetin remain, one after di other. Simple, nobody fit challenge am, and e honest: to lie no dey ever help.

We draw turn order — from di poll token, so anybody fit verify am. Each person, for im turn, go collect im favourite among wetin remain.

Start assignment with dis method →

How e dey work, well well

Dem fix di order. Draw na di sensible default, because any other order need explanation — seniority, need and merit all dey legitimate, but na political decisions.

Each person, for dia turn, take dia preferred option from wetin still dey. One pass dey enough; di result sharp and you fit check am line by line.

Two proven properties: di outcome dey Pareto-efficient (no rearrangement fit help somebody without hurting anoda person) and di mechanism dey strategy-proof (to declare your true preferences na always di best).

Example wey get figures

Four people, four assignments, order wey dem draw: Chloé, Ali, Bruno, Dana.

Person1st choice2nd choiceE collect
ChloéAuditRedesignAudit
AliAuditSupportSupport
BrunoRedesignAuditRedesign
DanaSupportTrainingTraining
  1. Chloé go first and take Audit, im first choice.
  2. Ali want Audit: e no dey again, so e take Support, im second choice.
  3. Bruno collect Redesign, im first choice; Training remain for Dana.

Three out of four people collect dia first choice. Di quality of di result depend completely on di draw: na why dem must announce di order and make e verifiable before di assignment.

Where e come from

Di procedure old like sharing itself, but social choice theory formalise am as « serial dictatorship »: for each step, one person dey decide alone — na why dem use dat word, wey describe di algorithm, no be any government.

E don structure North American sports drafts since 1947 (NBA), with di order reversed from di standings to balance di teams; di draft lottery, wey start for 1985, add chance to discourage teams from losing on purpose.

Economists study am under di house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). Dem establish say na one of di few mechanisms wey dey efficient and nobody fit manipulate.

Where dem dey use am

  • To share assignments, slots, desks or equipment inside team.
  • Sports drafts and player selection.
  • To share rooms for hostel or shared flat.
  • To pick internship or project topics among students.

Limits and wahala

✓ GOOD SIDE
  • Impossible to cheat: sincere ranking na always di best
  • Very easy to explain and accept
  • Verifiable draw, no favouritism possible
✕ BAD SIDE
  • Di last people for di order go collect leftovers
  • Luck dey weigh heavy for di result
  • E no look how strong di preferences be
Rank no dey equal
Di first person almost always collect dia wish, di last one almost never. If di thing dey repeat, di order must rotate.
Envy fit dey
Di last person wey dem serve fit envy di first one with reason. Efficiency no dey guarantee say nobody go vex.
E no dey see intensity
Wish wey be life-and-death and wish wey be lukewarm dey weigh di same. If urgency matter, maximum satisfaction fit better.

Questions wey people dey ask

Make we draw di order?

Na di default wey easy pass to defend, because e no need any explanation. Any other order — seniority, need, merit — na judgement call wey you must own publicly before di assignment, never after.

I get anything to gain if I lie about my wishes?

No, never, and dem don prove am. When your turn reach, you go take di best option wey remain: to declare anything else fit only harm you. Na wetin dem dey call strategy-proof mechanism.

Serial dictatorship or maximum satisfaction?

Serial dictatorship dey transparent and nobody fit challenge am, but e dey depend on di draw. Maximum satisfaction dey optimise di group total, but nobody fit redo di calculation for head. Choose based on wetin di group must accept: clarity or di optimum.

Check dis too

Maximum satisfactionTrading circleTwo groups (Parcoursup)

Voting methods