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Majority judgment

You grade, di majority grade win.

Each option go collect grade (from « reject » to « very good »), and na di MEDIAN grade dey decide. Dem design di method to resist tactical voting.

Everybody give each option grade (from "Reject" to "Excellent"). Di option wey get di highest median grade win.

Judge by grades; e reduce tactical voting.

Start vote with dis method →

How e dey work, well well

Di voter give grade to EACH option, separate from di others: dem dey evaluate, no be rank. Two options fit collect di same grade.

For each option, dem arrange di grades and take di median — di grade wey majority judge « at least dis good » and majority judge « at most dis good ». Unlike di average, di median no dey shake when person drop extreme grade for tactics.

If medians tie, dem go break am by removing median grades one by one from di tied options until dem separate. Na di same as comparing how many supporters and opponents dey around di median grade.

Example wey get figures

Three options wey eleven people grade on five-grade scale.

OptionGrades wey e collectMedian
Bordeaux3 Very good, 5 Good, 3 FairGood
Lyon5 Very good, 1 Good, 5 RejectGood
Lille2 Very good, 4 Fair, 5 PoorFair
  1. Bordeaux and Lyon get di same median grade: Good.
  2. Remove one median grade from each and start again: Bordeaux still get wider base above Good.
  3. Lyon, wey dey divide people (5 « Very good » but 5 « Reject »), fall behind.

Majority judgment prefer di option wey plenty people respect pass di one wey dey polarise. One-round vote for don crown Lyon on im five strong fans.

Where e come from

Majority judgment na Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki propose am for 2007, researchers for École polytechnique and CNRS, for di Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Dia main book, « Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing », come out for MIT Press for 2011.

Di inspiration no come from politics: wine competitions, gymnastics and figure skating don dey grade with word scales for long and dey throw away di extremes, because average too easy for one judge to manipulate.

Di authors test am for April 2007 with voters for Orsay during di French presidential election, side by side with di official vote. Since then several French citizen primaries don use am, including di Primaire populaire for 2022.

Where dem dey use am

  • Internal elections and citizen primaries, where you wan measure real support.
  • To assess applications, projects or suppliers on quality criteria.
  • Decisions where you wan catch di divisive option before you adopt am.
  • Any vote where di strength of support, no be just im existence, suppose count.

Limits and wahala

✓ GOOD SIDE
  • E show plenty feeling, no be just one choice
  • E reduce tactical voting
  • E measure real support
✕ BAD SIDE
  • Di median no too clear
  • Longer ballot
  • Plenty tie fit happen
E fail di Condorcet criterion
Option wey win every duel fit no get di best median. Di two methods dey measure different things, and you no fit get di two (Arrow theorem).
To calibrate di grades
« Fair » no mean di same thing for everybody. You must explain di scale before di vote, if not, na incomparable judgments you dey add.
Longer ballot
One grade per option pass one tick, and e dey show once options pass ten.
Technical tie-break
Di rule of removing medians correct but e hard to explain for meeting.

Questions wey people dey ask

Why median instead of average?

Because people fit buy average. Tactical voter wey give di lowest grade to serious rival go move dia average well; e go move di median only one step, and only if plenty people do di same. Di median na di heart of di method, no be calculation detail.

E dey truly impossible to manipulate?

No — di Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem no allow dat for any method. But majority judgment dey cut down wetin person fit gain from insincere vote, and na di best wey person fit prove.

How many grades I need?

Five or six, with clear word labels. If e less, you lose di detail; if e plenty, voters no fit separate di steps wey dey near each other.

Check dis too

Simple CondorcetApproval votingBorda count

Voting methods