How it works, precisely
Each voter picks one list, with no splitting between lists. The leading list immediately receives 50 % of the seats — the majority bonus.
The remaining 50 % are shared proportionally among ALL lists above the threshold, including the leading one, which therefore ends up with far more than its share of the vote.
In municipal elections a second round is held if no list reaches an absolute majority, with mergers allowed between qualified lists — hence the importance of negotiations between rounds.
A worked example
Twenty seats, three lists, a 50 % majority bonus.
| List | Votes | Bonus | Proportional | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 45 % | 10 | 4 | 14 |
| B | 35 % | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| C | 20 % | 0 | 2 | 2 |
- List A, in the lead, immediately receives 10 of the 20 seats.
- The remaining 10 seats are shared proportionally among the three lists.
- A totals 14 seats out of 20 — 70 % of the assembly with 45 % of the vote.
The distortion is not a flaw: it is the very point of the mechanism. A governing majority emerges on election night, at the accepted cost of under-representing the other lists.
Where it comes from
List voting with a majority bonus was set for French communes of 3,500 inhabitants and more by the law of 19 November 1982, which ended pure majority list voting and introduced a dose of proportionality.
A second law, of 31 December 1982, created the special regime for Paris, Lyon and Marseille (known as PLM), with elections by sector — a mechanism that has repeatedly produced a mayor elected without leading the city-wide vote.
The principle was extended to regional elections, with a reduced 25 % bonus, by the reforms of 1999 and 2003. The logic is constant: to arbitrate explicitly between representativeness and the ability to govern. Finally, the law of 21 May 2025 removed the threshold — since the March 2026 municipal elections, every commune votes by list, and vote-splitting between lists is gone.
Where it is used
- French municipal elections — in every commune since the 2025 reform.
- Regional elections, with a 25 % bonus.
- Electing a committee or board from competing slates.
- Any assembly that must be both representative and able to decide.
Limits and pitfalls
- Delivers a stable majority to govern
- Still represents minorities
- One ballot, very simple
- Heavily over-represents the winning list
- The list leader concentrates power
- The 5% threshold eliminates small lists
Frequently asked questions
Why a majority bonus?
To avoid ungovernable councils. Without it, a commune can spend six years with no stable majority. It is a choice of governability, paid for in representativeness.
Does the leading list also get proportional seats?
Yes. It receives the bonus AND its proportional share of the remaining seats, which is why it often reaches 70 % of the assembly.
Useful outside a municipal context?
Whenever you elect a team that must function together, rather than independent individuals. For plain options it is overkill.
Sources
The primary references this page relies on.
- Loi n° 82-974 du 19 novembre 1982 modifiant le code électoral et le code des communes relative à l'élection des conseillers municipaux et aux conditions d'inscription des Français établis hors de France sur les listes électorales, Légifrance, 1982. ↗
- Code électoral, article L. 262 (prime majoritaire de la moitié des sièges), Légifrance, en vigueur. ↗
- Loi n° 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 relative à l'organisation administrative de Paris, Marseille, Lyon et des établissements publics de coopération intercommunale (régime dit « PLM »), Légifrance, 1982. ↗
- Loi n° 2013-403 du 17 mai 2013 (seuil du scrutin de liste abaissé à 1 000 habitants), Légifrance, 2013. ↗
- Loi n° 2025-444 du 21 mai 2025 visant à harmoniser le mode de scrutin aux élections municipales (extension du scrutin de liste paritaire à toutes les communes, fin du panachage), Légifrance, 2025. ↗